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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the meaning of higher risk status to women undergoing 
prenatal maternal screening for chromosomal anomalies. Quotations from lightly 
structured interviews and transcripts of pre-screening consultations are used to 
illustrate pregnant women’s diverse responses to the offer of screening, and to 
entering, living with and exiting from higher risk status. Some women reject 
screening in order to avoid the psychosocial and medical risks associated with 
higher risk status, or because they rule out pregnancy termination. They may 
question the risk selection built implicitly into the provision of preventative 
systems for some health problems but not others. Women who screen at higher 
risk may challenge this designation by questioning the system-specific probability 
used to separate them from the lower risk population. However, some experience 
distress even when they appreciate the precautionary basis on which their higher 
risk designation is based. They may find disengagement from higher risk status 
difficult after a diagnostic test has ruled out chromosomal anomalies. The 
findings highlight the complexity of communicating risk information to pregnant 
women and other screened populations, the need to support those living with 
higher risk status and the benefits of keeping the time lived with this status as 
short as possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper will explore women’s understandings of higher risk health status, 
drawing upon a study of prenatal screening for chromosomal anomalies. Higher 
risk status is constituted by screening systems operating at the limits of 
technological innovation where non-invasive and individually accurate tests are 
not yet available. At this frontier, non-invasive screening systems which divide 
populations into categories with lower and higher probabilities of experiencing a 
health problem may be developed. Those who screen above a defined risk 
threshold can then be offered accurate but invasive diagnostic tests. Higher risk 
status, although not the conditions tested for, is entirely constituted by the 
screening system. Screened individuals may realise that the results will change 
‘their’ probability of encountering the selected problem, but cannot know the 
direction of this change.  
 
Ethical issues concerning abortion and disability (Williams, Alderson and 
Farsides, 2002) would remain even if an affordable, non-invasive and accurate 
diagnostic test for chromosomal anomalies were available. Screening offers a 
second-best, probabilistic view of the unknown chromosomal status of the fetus, 
derived from empirical associations, usually neither causal or understood, 
between diverse markers and the screened condition. Since each marker 
differentiates populations with a greater prevalence of the condition, combining 
markers will improve prediction providing that the markers are not themselves 
closely associated. Probabilistic induction from populations to individuals requires 
heuristic acceptance of the ecological fallacy that aggregate properties of a 
category appertain to its members (Robinson, 1950; Greenland and Robbins, 
1994; Heyman, Henriksen and Maughan, 1998).  
 
Heuristics offer simple rules concerning search, search termination and decision-
making in complex environments (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001, p. 8). Heuristics 
mostly work well enough, but will not always provide a sound guide to action, the 
price paid for simplification. The probability heuristic will assign some individuals 
to the higher risk group who do not have the health problem in question and vice 
versa. The proportions of cases located in these two undesirable categories will 
depend upon the accuracy of the screening indicators used and the cut-off 
probability employed for differentiating lower from higher risk cases. With 
infrequent events, even a low percentage of higher risk cases leads to a large 
proportion of cases being located in this category despite not having the index 
condition (Gigerenzer 2003). Table 1 illustrates this problem with respect to first 
trimester screening for Down’s syndrome and other less common chromosomal 
anomalies (Bindra et al., 2002).  
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Table 1: First Trimester Screening for Chromosomal Anomalies (Bindra et 
al, 2002)  
 
 fetus has DS  fetus has other 
chromosomal 
anomaly 
 fetus does not 
have chromosomal 
anomaly 
TOTAL 
Higher risk 
screening (>1:300) 
75 54 967 1096 
Lower risk 
screening (<1:300) 
7 7 13273 13287 
TOTAL 82 61 14240 14383 
 
Table 1 shows that the positive predictive value, the proportion of true cases 
among those classified as being at higher risk as about 12% (75+54/1096) for 
this system. Although it is more accurate than second trimester screening (e.g. 
Canini et al., 2002), about 90% of women who screen at higher risk will not be 
carrying a  fetus with chromosomal anomalies. Because maternal age is included 
in the risk calculation, older women face a much lower positive predictive value 
than do younger women, but are less likely to screen at lower risk if carrying a  
fetus with chromosomal anomalies (Spencer, 2001). 
 
Suggestions for improving the predictive power of this screening system, for 
example by assessing structural heart defects (Fredouille et al., 2002), are 
frequently put forward. However, increasing the number of markers may reduce 
the overall reliability of risk estimation as each marker may be affected by 
measurement error (Seth and Ellis, 1994). Combining first and second trimester 
screening, as recommended by Wald, Watt and Hackshaw (1999), would 
generate more accurate predictions but leave women waiting several weeks 
longer for their results. Prediction can also be improved by taking into account 
covariates of the screening markers, for example a previous higher risk 
classification in the absence of chromosomal anomalies, and a history of 
maternal smoking (Aitken  et al., 2003). Because of the atheoretical, weakly 
correlational nature of this form of knowledge, new candidate markers and 
covariates will be continually identified, subjecting established screening systems 
to constant pressure to change. 
 
The social status of being at higher risk is constituted entirely by screening 
provision. Its costs are psychosocial and medical. A recent systematic review of 
the extensive available literature (Green et al., 2004) concluded that women, 
particularly younger women, experience an increase in anxiety after screening at 
higher risk which is not necessarily assuaged by a negative diagnosis. One 
possible explanation for the latter finding is that screening at higher risk for 
chromosomal anomalies makes the risk of other adverse outcomes more salient. 
Conflicting research conclusions have been drawn as to whether serious 
psychological reactions are common (Leithner et al., 2004) or uncommon (Goel 
et al., 1998). The longer term impact of living temporarily with higher risk status is 
not known. Detection of higher risk through a scan rather than chemical markers 
may cause more anxiety (Weinans et al., 2004), perhaps because it is associated 
with viewing the  fetus. Green et al. (2004) hedge their conclusions with 
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methodological cautions, for example that more anxious women may exclude 
themselves from studies by declining to complete questionnaires. Moreover, they 
reference average responses. Qualitative data, including our own, discussed 
below, documents the crucial mediating role of women’s interpretations of being 
at higher risk. 
 
Available accurate but invasive diagnostic tests, chorionic villus sampling (CVS) 
and amniocentesis, are associated with medical risks, including that of 
spontaneous abortion (Tabor et al., 1986). The identified increase in risk is small, 
from 0.7% to 1.7% in the above large, randomised controlled trial of second 
trimester amniocentesis versus ultrasound screening, but is faced by all women 
who undergo diagnostic tests. Most will not be carrying a fetus with chromosomal 
anomalies. The chromosomal screening and testing system operates as an 
upwards risk escalator, since an initial risk assessment can lead to further 
interventions which in turn generate new psychosocial and medical risks 
(Heyman, 2005).  
 
The present paper will consider women’s perspectives on becoming candidates 
for higher risk status, living with this status, and exiting from it when 
chromosomal anomalies are ruled out.   
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data were collected at two hospitals in suburban London selected to be 
comparable in terms of the socioeconomic and ethnic profiles of their 
surrounding populations. Both offer universal maternal prenatal screening for 
chromosomal anomalies. One hospital, the ‘standard site’, provides second 
trimester screening based on maternal age and serum testing. Those with an 
estimated probability of carrying a  fetus with chromosomal anomalies greater 
than 1:250 are offered a diagnostic test, usually amniocentesis. Women have to 
wait one week for screening, and a further 10-21 days for diagnostic test results 
unless they pay for private testing. The survey indicated that that  about two-
thirds of respondents underwent screening, and that about two-thirds of these 
women opted to pay for private nuchal translucency thickness screening via an 
ultrasound scan (Lewando Hundt et al., 2005). 
  
The ‘innovative site’ provides first trimester screening based on nuchal thickness, 
maternal age and serum testing. Women receive a pre-test consultation, 
screening and a post-test  consultation about their combined risk estimate at a 
single one hour visit. Women whose probability of carrying a  fetus with 
chromosomal anomalies is estimated to be greater than 1:300 are offered a 
diagnostic test, amniocentesis or CVS, with results delivered within one week. 
The innovative site generates more accurate screening results than the standard 
site. This gain is taken as a reduced proportion of chromosomal anomalies within 
the lower risk category for the same (5%) rate of women classified as at higher 
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risk. The survey data indicated higher screening uptake at the innovative than at 
the standard site  (Lewando Hundt et al., 2005). 
 
The research protocol was approved by the two local research ethics 
committees. Participants received an information sheet, and gave informed 
consent to be included in the study. The study design included surveys, 
interviews and transcription of consultations. The present paper draws primarily 
on lightly structured multiple interviews with 27 women, undertaken at different 
stages of their pregnancy, as summarised in Table 2, below.  
 
TABLE 2: Summary of Interview Sampling (N of respondents=27) 
SITE Innovative Standard TOTAL 
Pre-screening1 
  3   7 10 
Post-screening/diagnostic testing2 14   7 21 
Postnatal 11   9 20 
TOTAL 28 23 51 
 
1Before any screening would have occurred at that site. 
2After any screening/diagnostic testing would have been completed and results communicated, except in 
two cases, where results were not yet fully known. 
 
The ethnicity, pregnancy and age profiles of the interview sample match those of 
the cachement areas for the hospital research sites (Lewando Hundt et al., 
2005). Three respondents were from non-White ethnic groups, and 17 were 
undergoing their first pregnancy. Five interviewees were aged over 35, putting 
them roughly into the current higher risk category on the basis of their age 
related probability (1:310) of chromosomal anomalies alone. Two of these older 
women screened at lower risk, two screened at higher risk and accepted 
diagnostic testing, and one opted for diagnostic testing without screening on 
account of her age (40). Four younger women, aged 34 or younger, screened at 
higher risk. Two of these women declined diagnostic testing. 
 
After the pre-screening interviews had been completed, additional respondents 
were purposively sampled for post-screening/diagnostic testing interviews to 
cover different screening pathways. The full sample included: screening declined 
(5); screened at lower risk (14); screened at higher risk but declined diagnostic 
testing (2); received a diagnostic test (5); and miscarried before screening (1). 
These pathways were represented at each site. No chromosomal anomalies 
were diagnosed within the interview sample. Because of the low numbers in most 
of these groups, the findings should be regarded as illustrative rather than 
representative. Two transcripts of consultations about chromosomal risks will 
also be drawn upon, but analysis focuses mainly on women’s retrospective views 
of the screening/diagnosis process. Overall, the sampling design allowed 
screening pathways to be explored prospectively and retrospectively at different 
pregnancy stages.  
 
Hospital staff sent out introductory letters and information leaflets with the first 
appointment booking letter. Women were then approached personally at the 
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clinic. Approximately half declined to participate at each site. Respondents were 
offered a choice of location, with most interviews taking place at their home. The 
interviews, which mostly lasted 60-90 minutes, covered a range of pregnancy 
related issues, but the present paper focuses on discussions of chromosomal 
screening and diagnostic testing. Consultations with a health care practitioner, 
usually a midwife, were tape-recorded, or transcribed using shorthand if consent 
to tape-record was not given. Only about 20% of women approached agreed to 
their consultation being taped. The interviews and consultations are not 
necessarily representative, but allowed a range of views to be explored. 
Inevitably, the reported study outcomes reflect the researchers’ selection of data. 
 
The  qualitative interview data and  consultation recordings were analysed 
thematically in relation to women’s understandings of risk management for 
chromosomal anomalies. The categorisation was influenced by a previous study 
of risk management in prenatal chromosomal screening (Heyman and Henriksen, 
2001). The approach adopted fits well with framework analysis (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003), i.e. systematic consideration of themes derived from the data. Data 
interpretations were discussed within the research team. However, the validity of 
the qualitative analysis offered needs to be judged by the reader. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Data analysis explored the beginning, middle and end of women’s encounters 
with higher risk status, in relation to the following four questions. How do risk 
considerations affect pregnant women’s decisions to accept or reject screening? 
How do screened women manage the period of higher risk candidacy? What 
does being at higher risk mean to those who temporarily acquire this status? 
How do women understand their exit from higher risk status?  
 
Information about each data extract, provided at the end of each quotation, 
includes a numerical case identifier indicating the site (1 innovative and 2 
standard) with a unique identifier following the decimal point (e.g. 2.4), the 
participant’s age, a brief indicator of the screening decision/outcome and the data 
source. With respect to screening outcomes, women were informed that they 
were at lower or higher risk of chromosomal anomalies depending on whether 
the overall probability of this outcome was below or above the threshold chosen 
by the screening site managers for recommending diagnostic testing (1:250 and 
1:300 at the standard and innovative sites as outlined above). 
 
Screening Decision-Making 
Acceptance of Higher Risk Candidacy 
 
Women who were screened and informed of their results faced a five percent 
probability that they would screen at higher risk. Hence, all screened women 
became candidates for higher risk status, which most would not acquire. Themes 
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associated with acceptance of screening included routinisation of the procedure, 
use of a heuristic of trust to simplify complex probabilistic reasoning, engagement 
with the maternity care system through screening, and selective attention to 
screened for conditions. Exceptionally, women acquired higher risk status 
against their wishes. 
 
Some women accepted screening without question, even though this decision 
placed them at risk of acquiring higher risk status. The survey  showed that a 
much higher proportion of women attending the innovative site than of those 
attending the standard site agreed with the statement that screening was part of 
routine care, i.e. that its acceptance was unproblematic, and that it was assumed 
that they would be having it (Lewando Hundt  et al., 2005). The following 
discussion of a taped consultation illustrates how routine acceptance of 
screening for chromosomal anomalies could be accomplished.  
 
Screening is introduced in the context of, as the midwife puts it, ‘what we call a 
low risk pregnancy’. This context may lead women to conclude that their 
chromosomal screening status will also be low risk. Having outlined the 
screening procedure, the midwife describes its probabilistic logic. 
 
Midwife: And then the computer churns out a piece of paper that says this 
woman’s risk is one in a hundred, one in 1000, one in 10,000. It doesn’t 
diagnose. That’s the main thing to stress. It doesn’t come out and say this 
woman has got a baby with an abnormality. It just puts into category of risk.  
Pregnant woman: Right.  
Midwife: Anybody with a risk of between 1 in 300 is considered by us to be 
what we call slightly higher risk than the national average. So we then talk to 
you again and give you the chance to have further tests.  
Pregnant woman: Right.  
Midwife: But … if we came along and said, ‘You’ve come back, and the risk 
is 1 in 280’, that still means it’s fairly low ... So the main thing is to stress, 
don’t get into a panic if you do decide to be screened and you get a recall, 
because, for every 100 women we recall, only five will have a baby with a 
problem. The other 95 will have a time of anxiety, but they wont be a 
problem, so -  
Pregnant woman: Right.  
Midwife: Do you think you want to have the screening done? 
Yeah. (Booking consultation 1.4, age not known, accepted screening, 
innovative site) 
  
This quotation illustrates the complexity of the probabilistic reasoning which 
health professionals attempt to communicate to service users. The cut-off of 
1:300 used in this centre to differentiate lower from higher risk is justified in 
relation to the ‘national average’. This interpretation naturalises the selected cut-
off, obscuring its origin in a system-specific tradeoff between test sensitivity and 
specificity. The emphasis placed on computerised calculations, as against the 
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assumptions behind them, gives the decision-making process an aura of 
objective description. The reference to a 5:100 ‘recall’ rate appears to confuse 
the overall risk of receiving a higher risk test result (5%) with the risk of having a  
fetus with chromosomal anomalies given a higher risk screening result. The best 
estimate of the latter is a woman’s screening result.  
 
Qualitative analysis documents women’s reasons for accepting screening. The 
unquestioning acceptance of screening is illustrated below. 
 
Interviewer: Why did you decide to have the screening test … 
Pregnant woman: There’s no reason to say no. Anyway the blood was fine, 
and you might as well, yeah. (1.4, aged 28, screened lower risk, innovative 
site, postnatal interview) 
 
Although this respondent justified her acceptance of screening in terms of her 
lower risk status, she could not have anticipated this outcome when she made 
her decision. The aside of ‘you might as well’ suggests that health services 
should be accepted if offered. In turn, this view is predicated on the trust which 
some women placed in the beneficence of the NHS. 
 
Who would really get into so much detail to find out [about screening] even 
though my family, like my dad is a consultant anaesthetist, and my mother a 
dentist? But you just … basically trust [name of consultant], and whatever is 
to be done, then just do it. (1.4, aged 28, screened lower risk, innovative 
site, post-screening interview) 
 
This woman employed trust in medicine as a heuristic substitute for engaging 
with the complex ‘detail’ of probabilistic inference. However, she may not have 
appreciated the cost of accepting screening, namely acceptance of the risk of 
acquiring higher risk status in the absence of chromosomal anomalies. 
 
Another feature potentially linking the mere offer of screening to its acceptance is 
its association to engagement with the maternity care system.  
 
Pregnant woman: Well, I’ve got a [dating] scan on the 16th of September, 
and I don’t see the midwife until after I’ve been to the scan. I would only see 
anybody if I did go for the triple test. That is the only time you see anybody 
in between … 
Interviewer: And how are you feeling about the scan? 
Pregnant woman: I can’t wait. I will feel better when I go to the scan, 
because I just can’t wait to see something on that screen because you still 
don’t feel like you are [pregnant]! (2.12, aged 26, declined screening, 
standard site, interview before screening would have been undertaken) 
 
NICE guidelines (2003) recommend that women should have a booking 
appointment in the first trimester and a dating scan at 11-13 weeks. At the 
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(standard) hospital referred to in the above quotation, women had contact with 
health professionals only for screening during a substantial phase of their 
pregnancy. Contact can confer incidental benefits including affirmation of 
pregnant status. Despite missing these benefits, the above respondent had 
rejected screening, not being willing to accept an increased risk of miscarriage 
from amniocentesis if she screened at higher risk. 
 
Acceptance of higher risk candidacy entailed selective attention to chromosomal 
anomalies such as Down’s syndrome. 
 
Interviewer: Have you got any ideas of the sorts of things that the scan can 
show … 
Pregnant woman: Yeah, just any other sort of obvious defects, um, or, you 
know, from, I suppose, something like Spina Bifida … But you always sort of 
think about Down’s syndrome more, I think, because there’s more press 
almost, kind of. People know more about it. (2.4, aged 30, private screening, 
standard site, interview after screening tests but before results known) 
 
This woman had articulated the link between medical provision and risk 
selection. However, by defining the influence of medicine in terms of ‘knowledge’, 
she legitimated prioritising Down’s syndrome over those of other conditions.  
 
Acceptance of higher risk candidacy could be grounded in diverse projections 
about the future. For example, women who have ruled out diagnostic testing and 
termination may gamble that screening will generate a reassuring lower risk 
result (Heyman and Henriksen, 1998:183). Women who accepted screening on 
the basis that they would proceed to diagnostic testing if they screened at higher 
risk were required to gauge their feelings about a hypothetical contingency, an 
issue explored in the next quotation. 
 
We were asked if we had talked about what to do if the result had come 
back high risk, whether or not we’d want an amnio or not. And we were 
explained that a lot of people at that stage say, ‘Yes, definitely we want 
one’, but then, once they look into it a little bit more, realise … the risk of the 
amnio, they actually then choose not to have one. (2.15, aged 29, 
amniocentesis after higher risk screening, standard site, interview post-
screening/diagnostic testing) 
 
Despite being explicitly granted the licence to change their minds, this couple felt 
compelled to commit themselves to following through if necessary. 
 
And she would have probably have sent us away … [if] we’d have actually 
said, ‘No. If the amnio comes back positive, we don’t know what we’d do’.  
I’m not sure. She might have sent us away. She might have said, ‘Look, I 
want you to decide on this before you proceed’. But we’d already decided, 
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so it was pretty easy for her. (2.15, aged 29, amniocentesis after higher risk 
screening, standard site, interview post-screening/diagnostic testing) 
 
Even when given advice to the contrary, women may feel that agreeing to 
screening entails acceptance of diagnostic testing if indicated.  
 
Exceptionally, a woman could become an involuntary candidate for higher risk 
status when health professionals inadvertently screened her and informed her of 
the results even though she had declined screening, as illustrated below. 
 
I was happy to have the blood tests done, and anything like that. But I 
wasn’t prepared to have the Down’s syndrome tests done anyway, and I 
had already made up my mind about that. (1.2, aged 21, involuntary higher 
risk screening, declined diagnostic testing, innovative site, post-screening 
interview) 
 
This woman had decided to only accept serum screening for conditions such as 
HIV which could be treated. The error in this case may have resulted from the 
same test media, blood and ultrasound, being used for different purposes. 
Unfortunately, she had screened at higher risk and was trapped in this status 
until her baby was born. She could not ‘unknow’ the information which put her 
into the higher risk category (Williams, Alderson and Farsides, 2002). 
Rejection of Higher Risk Candidacy 
 
Women declined screening for various reasons, including rejection of its ultimate 
endpoint, abortion, challenging the risk selection implicit in the provision of 
screening for certain conditions, and avoidance of the anxiety arising from higher 
risk status. Ethical objections to abortion are illustrated below. 
 
As I said earlier, we’re Christians, and we’ve been praying to have a baby 
for years. So we’re ready to accept what God gives us regardless, you 
know. And we know that he doesn’t give bad gifts … We are going to get a 
healthy baby. And whether the baby comes out right, we’re going to have it. 
So why test it? (1.13, aged 35, declined screening, innovative site, interview 
after screening would have been undertaken)  
 
Women who rejected pregnancy termination might still accept screening on the 
grounds of uncertainty reduction or in order to prepare themselves to care for a 
child with disabilities. However, this respondent, having ruled out abortion, saw 
no point in accepting screening. 
 
Those who accepted screening took on an implicitly selective attitude towards 
risk concerns, as discussed above. Conversely, women who rejected screening 
could challenge its validity by declining to accept this attitude. 
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And there’s someone I work with, she had it [Down’s syndrome screening] 
done. All her tests came back fine, and then her baby was born, and he’s 
got, like, albinoism, you know. He’s got problems with his sight. So, 
obviously, you can’t detect everything. Obviously, the test isn’t for all that. 
But it just goes to show, you never know what’s going to be wrong. (2.12, 
aged 26, declined screening, standard site, interview before screening 
would have been undertaken) 
 
Putting the available screening for chromosomal anomalies in a wider context  
reduced its perceived power to prevent the birth of a baby with health problems, 
thereby bolstering its rejection. 
 
For some women, the risk of facing the worry associated with higher risk status 
influenced their decision to decline screening.  
 
Pregnant woman: Then you could come back a high risk, and there could 
be nothing. There could be no risk at all ... And then if you have that 
[amniocentesis] done, there’s a chance you can miscarry, so I would hate 
that to happen. That’s why I think there’s no point in having that first bit done 
because I worry about things as it is. (1.13, aged 35, declined screening, 
innovative site, interview after screening would have been undertaken) 
 
As noted in relation to acceptance of higher risk candidacy, the rationale for her 
decision required this woman to make assumptions about how she would feel if 
she screened at higher risk. 
Living with Higher Risk Candidacy 
 
Screened women must live with uncertainty about their risk status until informed 
of their results. Contexts of risk interpretation associated with feeling anxious or 
not anxious are considered below.  
 
Even the short wait required at the innovative site could generate considerable 
stress, as illustrated by the following consultation extract. 
 
Midwife: The combined risk is what we look at, and the cut-off point on the 
combined risk is 1 in 300, and your combined is 1 in 9,922 … 300 or less is 
a risk.  
Pregnant woman: That’s what I’ve got worried about. So I’m - 
Midwife: Yes. The test in the screening is no way 100% guaranteed. 
Pregnant woman: No, no. That looks fine to me though. That’s a relief. I 
was getting a bit worried. 
Midwife: Getting stressed? 
Pregnant woman: Yes. It’s my first, so I’m worrying about everything. 
Midwife: Are you coming back to do classes with us? (Post-screening 
consultation 1.32, age not known, innovative site, transcript extract)  
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This respondent took responsibility for the anxiety engendered by her higher risk 
candidacy, which she attributed to her neophyte status. The midwife’s reference 
to ‘stress’ and her invitation to the woman to return to take classes reinforced 
service user ownership of anxiety about her risk status. The phrase ‘300 or less 
is a risk’ nicely illustrates how an administratively determined cut-off for offering 
diagnostic testing could be transformed into an apparently natural property. 
 
Women attending the standard site, who had to wait a week for screening 
results, did not necessarily experience high anxiety. The woman quoted below 
had been protected by optimistic assumptions which, unfortunately, were 
disconfirmed. 
 
And that week wasn’t spent worrying about it [screening] at all, to be honest. 
I was quite complacent in the fact that I thought everything would be okay. 
Then it came to Saturday and Sunday, and I sort of thought about it a little 
bit more, and I realised that Monday, Monday’s the time that I might get a 
call ... She told me I’d come back as a high risk. And I was really upset, and 
I was crying, and she told me that I was 1 in 133. (2.15, aged 29, 
amniocentesis after higher risk screening, standard site, interview post-
screening/diagnostic testing) 
 
The drama of waiting for and receiving bad news perhaps contributed to this 
woman’s distress. A sense of fatalism had partially protected the next respondent 
quoted from anxiety during the waiting period. 
 
We did sort of speak about it quite a lot, but then I just tried to forget 
about it. Things like that you have no control over, I believe. So, if it’s 
meant to be it’s meant to be, do you know what I mean? So I don’t 
feel it’s worth sitting there pondering and worrying about it too much. I 
was a bit sort of anxious waiting for the results to come back, but 
then I’m like that with results of any sort. But they were fine when 
they came back. (2.11, aged 32, lower risk screening, standard site, 
interview post-screening) 
 
These two examples illustrate ways in which women could manage the 
relatively long waiting period required at the standard site. Although the 
qualitative data did not reveal any examples of women experiencing 
extreme anxiety during the waiting period for screening results (as against 
diagnostic test results), a shorter waiting time reduced the need to adopt 
time management tactics. 
Living with Higher Risk Status 
 
Ascribing higher risk entails conversion of continuous probability values into a 
binary classification on the basis of an arbitrary cut-off. Differences in women’s 
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interpretations of and responses to this conversion are explored below. Women 
did not necessarily accept their higher risk classification, but some became highly 
distressed even if they appreciated its precautionary basis. Distress could be 
associated with self-blame, concealment of pregnancy and avoidance of 
identification with the fetus. Relationships with health professionals could 
become tense during this difficult waiting period. 
 
The woman quoted below based rejection of the higher risk status ascribed to 
her on questioning the way in which probabilities were represented.  
 
One in 61 was what my risk level was, or whatever. And my dad came back 
to me and said, ‘That’s only 2%. It’s a very, very small number’. If someone 
had said to me 2%, I think I would have understood that more than 1 in 61. 
(2.14, aged 34, screened at higher risk but declined diagnostic test, 
standard site, interview post-screening)  
 
This interpretation questions the cut-off used to differentiate higher and lower risk 
statuses, and contrasts with the acceptance of higher risk status discussed 
below. The next respondent quoted appeared to accept her risk (1:174) as both 
normal and high. 
 
Um, well I think it was a normal result … I don’t know if I’ve got my figures 
right, but I thought 1 in 250, if there’s 250 women there, one would have an 
abnormality. So 1 in 174, or whatever it was, I just imagined 174 women, 
and I could be that one person. So, yeah, it did seem quite a high risk, yeah. 
(2.16, aged 33, amniocentesis after higher risk screening, standard site, 
interview post-screening/diagnostic testing) 
 
Communication even of a relatively ‘normal’ probability of an adverse event 
made it seem possible, and therefore ‘quite high’. One woman had correctly 
reasoned that the cut-off of 1:250 was based on the precautionary principle, i.e. 
maximising detection. 
 
And if it’s more than 1 in 250, you’re called a high risk, which I think is a 
terrible phrase for it, because high risk really means more than a 50% 
chance, and it’s not so. I actually came back with a 1 in 133, which is a one 
in point something percent chance, 0.75 I think we worked out the percent 
chance was, so hardly high risk. But, nevertheless, I don’t suppose they 
take many chances. (2.15, aged 29, amniocentesis after higher risk 
screening, standard site, interview post-screening/diagnostic testing) 
 
Despite identifying her risk status, which she labelled ‘high’ rather than ‘higher’, 
as precautionary, this woman experienced considerable distress during her three 
week waiting period (at the standard site) for her amniocentesis result. 
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You would have to, you know, to stop something like that you just wanted so 
desperately um. So, yeah, very difficult to deal with. And I tried to stop 
myself thinking about that until we had the results, and thought what’s the 
point in upsetting myself and maybe upsetting the baby … And to a certain 
extent that worked as well … Just kept busy as much as I could, um, 
because you’d just sit at home and dwell on it. And it takes forever. (2.15, 
aged 29, amniocentesis after higher risk screening, standard site, postnatal 
interview) 
 
During the waiting period for diagnosis, the status of the desperately wanted 
pregnancy became indeterminate. Although women may be told that most 
diagnostic tests generate negative results, higher risk status can take on a reality 
of its own. This woman’s concern was heightened by fear that her anxiety might 
be transmitted psychosomatically to the baby. She used time management 
techniques in order to get through a three week waiting period during which 
subjective time had slowed down.  
 
Some women looked to their own conduct for an explanation of their higher risk 
status, compounding anxiety with self-blame. 
 
I had like, I think it was ‘flu … I was taking painkillers for 10 days. I asked 
the midwife, ‘Is it … something to do with them?’. You just feel, you look for 
answers, don’t you? … And she said, ‘No. It’s just something that happens 
with genetics and chromosomes, nothing that you’ve done’. (1.1, aged 36, 
CVS after higher risk screening, innovative site, interview post-
screening/diagnostic testing) 
 
Her midwife had been able to reassure this respondent. As well as coping 
personally, women classified as at higher risk had to manage their relationships 
with others. The woman quoted below dealt with this issue through concealment, 
the requirements of which increased her distress. 
 
I’m having problems at work, as to what to wear and things, and 
hope that nobody notices … And emotionally, from lying to people 
basically ... I think I prefer to do it [conceal the pregnancy] particularly 
because we have decided that, if the results were very bad, we 
would terminate. I don’t want to have to tell people that I’ve had a 
termination. (2.1, aged 40, amniocentesis after higher risk screening, 
standard site, interview post-screening/diagnostic testing)  
 
This respondent’s estimated probability of having a baby with chromosomal 
anomalies had been given as 1:119 based on her age which reduced to 1:249 
after serum screening. The hospital used a probability of 1:250 as the cut-off for 
recommending diagnostic tests, which, she commented, was ‘just one below not 
high risk’. Ironically, she had been catapulted into higher risk status by a 
screening result which reduced her prior age-based probability of  carrying a  
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fetus with chromosomal anomalies. This woman’s acceptance of a borderline 
higher risk attribution was influenced by her belief that the test is ‘only 60/40 
accurate’. However, the ‘60/40 problem’, as this respondent described it, refers to 
the (40%) probability of woman screening at lower risk despite the presence of a 
fetal chromosomal anomaly. As she had screened at higher risk, this issue, of 
test sensitivity, did not apply to her case but, nevertheless, affected her 
understanding of being at higher risk.  
 
Women placed in the higher risk category had to manage their relationships with 
health professionals whilst occupying this status. Two contrasting attitudes are 
illustrated below. The first respondent quoted valued the impartial but 
sympathetic thoroughness shown by the professional advising her. 
 
No I was really pleased with the way that they handled everything. I thought 
the lady who spoke to us before the tests, or the amnio rather, we didn’t feel 
hurried by her. She was open for any questions. She explained things in a 
very matter of fact way without seeming opinionated at all. She would give 
all the options without implying in her voice or how she said at which one 
she thought was the better one. (2.15, aged 29, amniocentesis after higher 
risk screening, standard site, postnatal interview) 
 
Another respondent felt that the same hospital had failed to give her emotional 
support. 
 
I know, it sounds silly really, but … maybe they’re understaffed at [standard 
site], but they don’t really seem to give you the time that, to understand what 
it’s like, what you’re going through. (2.16, aged 33, amniocentesis after 
higher risk screening result, standard site, interview post-
screening/diagnostic testing) 
 
The next quotation depicts an unsympathetic response to a display of anxiety by 
a woman who was being scanned after being classified as at higher risk of 
trisomy 13 or 18. 
 
And then I put my arm up over here, so then I shielded her [image of  fetus] 
because I didn’t want to see anything. And she said, ‘Just keep your eye on 
the screen’. (1.1, aged 36, CVS after higher risk screening, innovative site, 
interview post-screening/diagnostic testing) 
 
Service users will inevitably be treated differently, and will respond in diverse 
ways to the care they receive, particularly at a time of stress.  
 
Exit from Higher Risk Status 
 
Women lost their higher risk status when the chromosomal status of the fetus 
became known. The speed at which this transition was absorbed varied 
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considerably. The respondent quoted below had moved easily from higher to no 
risk status. 
 
I knew that it was definitely a normal result for Down’s, and any other thing 
that they came back with would just be bad luck. There was no high risk of 
that. There was just as much chance of the other things as any other 
woman having a baby. So I relaxed. I was really pleased. (2.15, aged 29, 
amniocentesis after higher risk screening, standard site, postnatal interview) 
 
One factor which might have contributed to the smoothness of this transition was 
her relief at a shortening of the waiting period for diagnosis. Initially informed that 
she would have to wait three weeks for diagnostics test results, this respondent 
then found that she could obtain partial results, including Down’s syndrome for 
which she was at higher risk, within a week by purchasing private testing.  
 
The transition from higher risk status sometimes required more than a diagnostic 
all clear, perhaps because the associated emotions could not be simply switched 
off, as the following quotation illustrates. 
 
Although I do remember that the letter [confirming negative amniocentesis 
result] took a while to get here, and then I started to question myself a bit 
more … It was nice to get the letter, quite strangely, I don’t know why, to 
have it in writing, that guarantee again. (2.1, aged 40, amniocentesis after 
higher risk screening, standard site, postnatal interview) 
 
The health professionals who gave the above respondent this good news 
reminded her of its limitations. 
 
They said [at the time of giving amniocentesis result], ‘You realise that this 
is not, it doesn’t mean that you’re going to have a healthy baby’ … They 
were obviously trying to say, ‘This test is only to look at certain things, and 
don’t think there’s nothing else that could go wrong’, kind of thing. Not very 
well put either. But, I think it was almost as if, if, then, we’d gone on to have 
a child with webbed feet, that we’d come back and say, ‘Oh excuse me, I 
was guaranteed a perfect baby because I had an amnio’. (2.1, aged 40, 
amniocentesis after higher risk screening, standard site, postnatal interview) 
 
This caution, which the above respondent found patronising, can be understood 
as a reminder that total exit from higher risk status with respect to one health 
problem does not imply the absence of other risks. As had respondent 2.15, 
quoted above, this woman appeared to re-engage with other risks following her 
exit from higher risk status for chromosomal anomalies. 
 
Another respondent had not established attachment to the unborn child until a 
month after receiving the all clear. 
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And one of the things that I ended up going for is actually saying that we’d 
like to know the sex of the baby if everything was ok …  And it probably took 
me about another month after having the results to actually finally think to 
myself, ‘I am pregnant. I want to have this child’. (2.3, aged 40, 
amniocentesis on account of previous history, standard site, postnatal 
interview) 
 
Knowing the sex of the baby would have established its personhood. The 
emotional barrier to engagement with the pregnancy, erected in case the adverse 
outcome associated with higher risk status came to pass, took time to break 
down.  
 
Even grasping that a transition from higher risk to no risk status had taken place 
could prove problematic. 
 
We kept thinking, ‘Well, if it [diagnostic test] is clear …  there must, it can’t 
be just that easy. There must be a next stage they’re not telling us about’. It 
can’t be, ‘Oh yes, the results are clear. You’ve got a healthy baby’. There 
must be some other news they were going to break to us. (1.1, aged 36, 
amniocentesis after higher risk screening, innovative site, interview post-
screening/diagnostic testing)  
 
The difficulty experienced can be understood in terms of the tendency in risk-
oriented cultures to project uncertainty onto the external world. This projection 
may generate a belief that an individual placed into the higher risk category has a 
health problem. The above respondent found it difficult to understand that only 
the information about her baby, rather than the baby itself, had changed. 
DISCUSSION 
 
This paper has explored the process of chromosomal risk management at two 
maternity units operating ‘standard’ and ‘innovative’ screening systems. No 
claims are made about the typicality of the qualitative findings, which are 
designed more to illustrate ‘what things “exist” than to determine how many such 
things there are’ (Walker, 1985, p. 4). 
 
As the UK and other countries move towards offering prenatal chromosomal 
screening universally, an increasing number of women will have to manage the 
psychosocial sequelae of higher risk status. Moreover, the advent of universal 
prenatal chromosomal screening reflects a wider shift towards a mode of health 
care in which concern for the individual case is replaced by a focus on the sorting 
of populations by risk indicators (Castel, 1991). Screening subjects its users to 
the risk of acquiring higher risk status. Its medical and psychosocial downsides 
have to be balanced against both the societal and personal gains arising from 
earlier detection of health problems and reassurance, for the majority, arising 
from the acquisition of lower risk status.  
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The data presented above document the complex processes through which the 
provision of screening technology influences risk perceptions. Midwives and 
doctors (Heyman and Henriksen, 2001) can struggle to explain the complexities 
of probabilistic induction. Some women accept healthcare on the basis of trust, a 
process likely to be accentuated as an innovative form of healthcare becomes 
routinised (Press and Browner, 1997). Although the qualitative findings, involving 
small numbers of women on different screening pathways, did not generate 
evidence of differences between the standard and innovative sites, the survey 
findings cited above show that women who were processed through the latter 
more technically advanced and automated system were more likely to view 
prenatal chromosomal screening as routine and to accept screening. Acceptors 
may not appreciate that by accepting screening they become candidates for 
higher risk status. Qualitative data document the interpersonal processes 
underlying routinisation.  
 
Responsibility for the ‘quality control’ of the fetus falls mainly on women (Rapp, 
1999: 87). Decision-making about screening requires women to predict how they 
would feel in hypothetical future situations (Williams et al., in press). Santalahti et 
al. (1998) found that only half of the women who said that they would decline a 
termination after a positive amniocentesis result actually did so. This analysis 
raises troubling issues concerning the possibility of informed consent as 
advancing technology widens the scope for screening provision. Although its 
critics may struggle to suggest preferable alternatives, the limitations of the 
principle of informed consent, particularly its discounting of the social processes 
determining the menu of choices available and influencing individual decisions 
(Corrigan, 2003), need to be acknowledged. Health professionals need to clearly 
understand probabilistic reasoning and to appreciate the difficulty of 
communicating risk information effectively. As screening technology becomes 
more powerful, increasing amounts of information can be obtained from the same 
source, e.g. blood tests. Care needs to be taken to avoid patients being 
inadvertently being given information about their risk status, for example in 
patient-held records, which they have opted not to receive.  
 
Screening creates a new, usually transient, role of living with higher risk status. 
The present study illustrates two challenges to the validity of this attribution. 
Firstly, the limited scope of chromosomal screening in relation to the overall 
range of pregnancy-related health problems could be noted. This challenge 
undermines the tacit selection of risks as targets for concern which is embedded 
in the provision of particular risk management systems. Secondly, the 
transformation of quantitative probabilities into the qualitative categories of 
‘higher’ versus ‘lower’ risk could be questioned.  
 
Those study participants who accepted higher risk status experienced varying 
degrees of distress during the waiting period for diagnostic test results, a time of 
arguably tentative pregnancy (Rothman, 1994). They treated their screening 
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result as ‘positive’, i.e. indicative of a likely problem, even when they clearly 
understood that this categorisation arose from being above a precautionary 
threshold. Such reactions should not be dismissed as mere misunderstanding, a 
view expressed by 80% of a sample of obstetricians (Green, 1994). More 
attention needs to be given to the needs of women who screen at higher risk 
(Green et al., 2004), and primary care professionals need to be more engaged in 
supporting them (Statham, Solomou and Green, 2003). Women will occasionally 
acquire higher risk status unintentionally through receiving results from screening 
tests which they had declined. Such accidents may become more likely as the 
same medium, e.g. blood tests or scans, are used for more and more screening 
purposes as technology advances. Women who acquire higher risk status 
inadvertently may be in particular need of support, and their inadvertent 
acquisition of higher risk status should be noted on their records. Exiting from 
higher risk status was not always straightforward. Similarly, Weinans et al. (2000) 
found that 13% of the women they surveyed continued to feel anxious after 
amniocentesis had ruled out chromosomal anomalies.  
 
The operation of screening systems marks some service users as at higher risk, 
and therefore in need of further investigation. These service users, who cannot 
be identified in advance, pay the price of living with higher risk status so that all 
can be given the option of taking preventative action if the conditions being 
screened for are eventually identified.  
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